Surveillance performance is studied for a wireless eavesdropping system, where a full-duplex legitimate monitor eavesdrops a suspicious link efficiently with the artificial noise (AN) assistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security has been proposed as a promising solution to achieve perfect wireless secrecy against malicious eavesdropping attacks (see e.g. [1] - [3] and references therein).
positive covert transmission rate. The jamming uncertainty was investigated in [20] , [21] , where the locations of the jamming transmitters follow a stationary Poisson point process (PPP). The performance analysis for covert transmission was also extended to multi-antenna systems in [22] , [23] . In addition, a full-duplex receiver injected AN and received messages simultaneously in [24] , [25] , where the AN power was designed to achieve the desired level of covertness. Furthermore, relay technology was deployed to enhance covert transmission performance in [26] - [28] .
In addition, the channel uncertainty at the warden can also affect the covert transmission performance. Most recently, the impact of channel uncertainty on covert transmission performance was studied in [29] - [31] . With regard to channel uncertainty, the channel state information (CSI) can be separated into the known part and the uncertain part at the receiver. The warden can determine the optimal detection threshold to cancel the known part. In [29] , the authors derived a closed-form expression for the optimal detection threshold and quantified the achievable rate.
It is shown in [29] that channel uncertainty could help hide the communication to a covert user.
The channel uncertainty was also exploited in [30] to achieve covert communication in relay networks, where the introduced channel uncertainty confused the warden and limited the ultimate detection performance. In [31] , the simulation results show the channel uncertainty has a greater effect on covert transmission rate when the noise uncertainty is larger.
Overall, in order to eavesdrop a suspicious communication link efficiently, the legitimate monitor should inject AN covertly, and control the AN transmission power carefully. However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, intelligent suspicious users, which are capable of detecting a jamming signal and can be common in future wireless networks, have not been well-understood in the literature. Motivated by the above considerations, in this paper, we first study the detection ability at the suspicious users. Then, a novel scheme is proposed to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability by optimizing the injected AN power. Moreover, we also investigate the impact of channel uncertainty on covert surveillance performance. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1. We consider a wireless surveillance system, where a full-duplex legitimate monitor tries to eavesdrop on a suspicious link with AN assistance. Different from the previous works, such as [5] , [6] , the suspicious receiver in this paper has the ability of detecting the AN signal, which is a reasonable assumption in advanced receivers, such as cognitive and militarygrade receivers. Specifically, if the suspicious receiver detects the AN from the legitimate monitor, it informs the suspicious transmitter to stop. As a result, the legitimate monitor can overhear nothing. Hence, the legitimate monitor should inject AN covertly. For this scenario, the performance of the surveillance system under a covert constraint is investigated in this paper for the first time, to the best of our knowledge.
2. For the surveillance system, an optimization problem is formulated to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability while the minimum DEP at the suspicious receiver is less than a given threshold. Closed-form expressions for the optimal detection threshold and the minimum DEP are derived under quasi-static channel fading. Then, based on these expressions, the covert constraint is transformed to an AN power constraint at the legitimate monitor. Finally, we propose an algorithm to achieve the maximum eavesdropping nonoutage probability. Numerical results show that the proactive eavesdropping scheme under a covert constraint substantially outperforms the two benchmark schemes in [4] .
3.
Considering that channel uncertainty is inevitable in practice, we analyze the suspicious receiver's AN detection ability under channel uncertainties first in the suspicious link and then in the jamming link. Interestingly, we find that the AN detection ability decreases with the suspicious link channel uncertainty, while it has a non-monotonic relationship with the jamming link channel uncertainty. For the extreme case of perfect suspicious link channel knowledge, the legitimate monitor cannot inject AN to assist its eavesdropping. By contrast, when there exists channel uncertainty for the suspicious link, even if the suspicious receiver has perfect knowledge of the jamming link, the legitimate monitor can still inject AN without being detected. 4. We investigate the impact of channel uncertainty on the non-outage probability for the proactive eavesdropping scheme. Numerical results reveal that the suspicious link channel uncertainty is beneficial to covert surveillance performance. By contrast, the jamming link channel uncertainty affects the surveillance system performance only when the AN power introduces a higher level of interference power at the suspicious receiver than the selfinterference power at the legitimate full-duplex monitor. Moreover, since the jamming link channel uncertainty has a non-monotonic effect on the AN detection ability, the legitimate monitor can actively expose the channel knowledge of the jamming link to weaken the suspicious user's detection ability and improve the non-outage probability for the proactive eavesdropping.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the covert surveillance system model and assumptions. Section III investigates the problem of covert AN transmission.
The surveillance performance under a covert AN constraint is analyzed in Section IV. Special February 19, 2020 DRAFT 
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where X a is the transmitted signal from Alice satisfying E X a [i] 2 = 1; i = 1, 2, ..., n is the index of each channel use and J a is the AN from Monitor satisfying E J a [i] 2 = 1. As in [5] , the residual self-interference channel is modeled by 
A. Channel Knowledge
Since the channel estimation problem is generally not error-free, we assume that h A,B can be separated into the known part h A,B and the uncertain part h A,B as in [29] , and it is given by
where h A,B and h A,B are independent complex Gaussian random variables with mean zero and variances (1 − ρ a,b ) σ 2 A,B and ρ a,b σ 2 A,B , respectively. ρ a,b ∈ [0, 1] denotes the correlation coefficient between h A,B and h A,B . Namely, when ρ a,b = 0, h A,B is perfectly known by Bob.
Usually, we assume that Bob can only know the statistical CSI of the Jamming Link h M,B , and rely on the average measure of his performance to detect the AN from Monitor [29] [30] .
Nevertheless, since Monitor injects AN, the instantaneous CSI of the jamming link can be tracked by Bob [32] - [34] . Due to the imperfect channel estimation, we specifically investigate the channel uncertainty of h M,B . In particular, h M,B at Bob can also be separated into the known part h M,B and the uncertain part h M,B , and it is given by 
B. Hypothesis Testing
In order to detect the AN from Monitor, Bob faces a binary hypothesis testing problem. We consider two events: H 0 and H 1 , where H 0 denotes the null hypothesis when Monitor does not transmit AN, and H 1 denotes the alternative hypothesis when Monitor transmits AN to Bob. For the two cases, the received signal at Bob is given by
By application of the Neyman-Pearson criterion [29] , the decision rule for Bob is given by
where Γ is the detection threshold; D 0 and D 1 are the decisions in favor of H 0 and H 1 , respectively. In this paper, we consider an infinite number of channel uses i.e., n → ∞. Thus, the average power received at Bob is given by [29] , [31] , (7) can be reformulated as
In this paper, the false alarm probability and the missed detection probability are defined as
Since the false alarm and the missed detection events are the two types of errors for Bob's hypothesis test, under the assumption of equal probability for H 0 and H 1 , the performance of Bob's hypothesis test is measured by
where ξ denotes the detection error probability (DEP). ξ = 0 means that Bob can detect AN without error, and ξ = 1 means that Bob cannot detect AN from Monitor at all. From the prosperity of Bob, it will determine the optimal detection threshold Γ * and obtain the minimum DEP ξ * based on the estimated CSI of the Suspicious link and Jamming link, i.e., P a ĥ A,B 2 and P J ĥ M,B
2
. From the perspective of Monitor, it will inject AN under the assumption that Bob has the best AN detection performance, i.e. the worst case for Monitor is addressed.
III. INJECTING AN COVERTLY
When Bob detects the interference from Monitor, Alice will stop transmission. This will degrade the surveillance performance. Hence, to improve the surveillance performance and prevent AN from being detected, the monitor should inject AN covertly and control the AN transmission power carefully. In this section, the worst case is considered where we assume that Bob has the best detection ability. The optimal detection threshold Γ * and minimum DEP ξ * at Bob are firstly derived under the channel uncertainties of h A,B and h M,B . Then, the maximum permitted transmission AN power at the monitor is determined under the covert constraint. For the optimal detection threshold Γ * and minimum DEP ξ * at Bob, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Γ * and ξ * are, respectively, given by
where
, and
Proof: According to (8) , the average power received at Bob is
where X 1 and X 2 are perfectly known by Bob. As in [29] , [30] , the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection are, respectively, given by
Since ξ = P F A + P M D , we can obtain the DEP as
Clearly, when
On the other hand, we find that ξ decreases with Γ when
ξ can achieve the minimum value. The proof of this lemma is completed.
Since Monitor has no knowledge about X 1 and X 2 , it has to rely on the average measure of Bob's detection performance to assess the possible covertness as in [29] . Note that the PDF of X 2 is given by
Hence, the average minimum DEP ξ * is calculated as
ξ * decreases withP J which is proved in Appendix A. To provide more insight, Fig. 2 shows ξ * for a given ρ m,b versus the normalized powerP J = P J /σ 2 b . The exactness of (17) is verified in Fig. 2 . Furthermore, we get the relationship between ξ * and ρ a,b , as well as with ρ m,b in the following remark. Specifically, when the jamming power is low, the jamming link uncertainty is beneficial to the covert transmission. But when the jamming power is large, the jamming link uncertainty is detrimental to the covert transmission because the optimal detection threshold is affected.
Moreover, the channel uncertainty can affect the AN power at Monitor by affecting Bob's AN detection ability, so as to affect the surveillance performance.
In practice, there are several factors affecting the uncertainty of the Suspicious link. For example, high dynamic channel in time, frequency, and space domain, and receiver capability. It is an effective way to improve the covert transmission performance by frequently changing the electronic environment at Bob. As a result, Bob is difficult to get the perfect knowledge of the Suspicious link. In addition, continuously changing the transmission power is also an attractive method to increase the jamming link uncertainty.
In this paper, covert transmission is assumed ξ * ≥ 1 − δ, where δ denotes a predetermined threshold for the covert transmission requirement. Note that when ξ * = 1−δ, we obtain P covert According to (18) , the covert constraint is transformed to an AN transmission power constraint at Monitor.
IV. SURVEILLANCE PERFORMANCE UNDER COVERT CONSTRAINT
When the AN power injected from Monitor is controlled to satisfy the covert constraint, Monitor can overhear the suspicious link efficiently. There are several metrics for wireless surveillance performance evaluation, such as the eavesdropping non-outage probability [4] , [5] , the average monitor rate [8] , [9] , and the successful eavesdropping rate or the effective eavesdropping rate [10] , [11] .
A. Eavesdropping Non-outage Probability
In this paper, for simplicity, we adopt the eavesdropping non-outage probability as a performance metric, which is defined as E [X]. X is an indicator function to denote the event of successful eavesdropping at Monitor as in [4] , and it can be expressed as
where X = 1 denotes eavesdropping non-outage event that Monitor can reliably decode the information, and X = 0 denotes eavesdropping outage event that Monitor cannot perfectly February 19 , 2020 DRAFT decode the information. R B and R M are, respectively, denoted as the achievable rates at Bob and Monitor, and they are given by
To successfully eavesdrop the information of the Suspicious Link, Monitor should ensure that its achievable data rate R M is greater than Bob's rate R B . According to (19) , E [X] can be formulated as
From (22) 
where (23b) is the AN power constraint. Equation (23c) is the covert constraint. Note that the objective function E [X] is not concave over the AN power P J . Fortunately, according to [5, Theorem 1] , the optimal AN power P * J can be expressed as
From (24), we find that P * J not only depends on the relationship between the channel gains and noise powers but also on Alice's transmission power, which is different from the existing works [4]- [7] . This behavior is caused by the channel uncertainty of the Suspicious link. In addition, even if AN introduces a higher level of interference power at Bob than the self-interference power at Monitor, Monitor still needs to consider the covert constraint rather than using full power to confuse Bob. As for the scenario that Monitor can already overhear from the transmitter successfully without AN or when the self-interference is severe, no AN is required and P * J = 0. After we determine the optimal AN power, the following lemma determines the exact eavesdropping non-outage probability E [X].
Lemma 2: E [X] can be calculated as (56).
Proof: See Appendix C. Lemma 2 presents a closed-form expression for the eavesdropping non-outage probability. To provide more insight, Fig. 3 shows the eavesdropping non-outage probability versus P J without covert constraint. In addition, the exactness of (56) is verified in Fig. 3 . We can see that the relationship between P J and eavesdropping non-outage probability is not monotonous, even if there is no covert constraint. This is due to self-interference effect.
Although it is challenging to obtain the exact expression for the optimal AN power and get the maximum eavesdropping non-outage probability under covert constraint, a simple search method can be sufficient to solve the optimization problem (23a). According to (18) , the allowable range of P J is ensured, thus the maximum E [X] can be obtained by Algorithm 1. In this algorithm, ∆P J denotes the incremental step for P J , and it can be determined by the required E [X] accuracy. c)if E [X] ≥ j. Then j=E [X] and P * J = P J 6: Until P J cannot satisfy (18) . The optimal AN power is P * J , and the maximum eavesdropping non-outage probability is j.
V. SPECIAL CASES
The covert surveillance model proposed in Section III can be useful for the general channel uncertainty cases, where we assume 0 < ρ m,b < 1 and 0 < ρ a,b < 1. In the following, we discuss the covert surveillance performance under several special cases.
A. Special Case 1: ρ a,b = 0, 0 ≤ ρ m,b ≤ 1 For this special case, Bob has perfect knowledge of the instantaneous h A,B , and the average power received at Bob is
where the average received power of H 0 is perfectly known by Bob. Since all channels are subject to quasi-static channel fading, the average power received at Bob of H 1 is higher than that of H 0 when Monitor injects the AN. If Bob already knows the average received power of H 0 , he can determine the detection threshold as Γ * = P a |h A,B | 2 + σ 2 b . Once Monitor injects the AN, it will be detected by Bob. Hence, it is better for Monitor to remain silent and P * J = 0. Following that, (22) can be rewritten as
B. Special Case 2: ρ a,b = 0, ρ m,b = 0
For this case, Bob has perfect knowledge of the Jamming Link and imperfect knowledge of the Suspicious Link. Bob's optimal detection threshold Γ * and minimum DEP ξ * are, respectively, given by the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For special case 2, Γ * and ξ * at Bob are given by
where X 1 and P J |h M,B | 2 are perfectly known by Bob. Thus, the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection are, respectively, given by
Since ξ = P F A + P M D , we can get the corresponding DEP as follows
Clearly, when Then, the average minimum DEP can be calculated as
where f P J |hM,B| 2 (x) = ρ a,b = 1. In this case, Bob's optimal detection threshold Γ * and minimum DEP ξ * under this special case are, respectively, given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For special case 3, Γ * and ξ * at Bob are, respectively, given by
.
where X 2 is perfectly known by Bob. Thus, the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection are, respectively, given by
Since ξ = P F A + P M D , we can get the corresponding DEP as
It is obvious that ξ decreases with Γ when σ 2 b ≤ Γ < X 2 + σ 2 b . Similar to Lemma 1, we can prove that ξ decreases with Γ when X 2 + σ 2 b ≤ Γ < X 2 + k 2 + σ 2 b , and ξ increases with Γ when Γ > X 2 + k 2 + σ 2 b . Hence, when Γ * = X 2 + k 2 + σ 2 b , ξ can achieve the minimum value, respectively. Thus, the average minimum DEP ξ * can be calculated as
the exactness of (40) is verified in Fig. 4 . Similar to Appendix B, we can verify that ρ m,b has a non-monotonic effect on ξ * in this case. Hence, the most desirable case is ρ a,b = 1 and ρ m,b = 1 or ρ a,b = 1 and ρ m,b = 0.
In particular, when ρ m,b = 1, Γ * and ξ * at Bob are, respectively, given by
. Also, when ρ m,b = 0, Γ * and ξ * at Bob are, respectively, given by
Note that we investigate special case 3 depending on ρ a,b = 1 and the different values of ρ m,b .
To provide more insight, Fig. 4 shows ξ * at a given ρ m,b versus the variable ρ a,b (in the range between 0 and 1). It is observed that ξ * increases as a function of ρ a,b . Note that ξ * = 0 when ρ a,b = 0, which is verified in special case 1. 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results for covert surveillance performance are presented under channel uncertainties for both the Suspicious link and the Jamming link. Assume the noise Figure 5 presents the average minimum DEP ξ * versus ρ a,b and ρ m,b for different P J . It can be seen from Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b) that increasing ρ a,b leads to the degradation of Bob's detection performance. In contrast, ρ m,b causes non-monotonic influence on ξ * just as shown in Fig. 5(b) , which is consistent with Remark 1. Specifically, when ρ a,b = 0 and ρ m,b = 0, we obtain ξ * = 0.
However, when ρ m,b = 0 and ρ a,b = 0, we obtain ξ * = 0. This means that Bob's imperfect Link is an effective means to enhance covert surveillance performance only when the selfinterference at Monitor is small. Fig. 7 . Different fromγ M,M in Fig. 6 ,γ M,B not only directly affects E [X] according to (22) , but also indirectly affects E [X] according to the covert constraint (17) . Whenγ M,B < −2dB, the curves of constant covert AN power scheme converge together for different values of δ since Monitor can inject AN with maximum power whenγ M,B is small. However, due to the fact that AN power introduces higher self-interference at Monitor, Monitor should keep silent and P * J = 0. In this case, the curves of optimal AN power scheme coincide with the curves of the passive eavesdropping scheme. Whenγ M,B = −2dB, the curves of constant AN power scheme begin to separate, since the covert constraint δ = 0.1 is stricter than δ = 0.5. Moreover, whenγ M,B < 7dB, E [X] of the optimal AN power scheme has same value for different δ. However, asγ M,B continues to increase, the value of E [X] with δ = 0.5 is larger than that with δ = 0.1. This observation demonstrates that a loose covert constraint can achieve higher eavesdropping performance only when the AN power at Bob is larger than the self-interference power at Monitor. In other words, once the self-interference becomes severe, Monitor should remain silent. Thus, the covert constraint has no effect on the surveillance performance. Figure 8 investigates the eavesdropping non-outage probability E [X] versus ρ a,b . It is clear that the curve of optimal AN power scheme coincides with the curve of constant covert AN power scheme whenγ M,M = −5dB in Fig. 8(a) . This figure demonstrates that when the AN introduces a higher level of interference power at Bob than the self-interference power at Monitor, it is better to use full AN power. However, whenγ M,M = −2dB in Fig. 8(b) , the self-interference becomes severe. Therefore, it is better for Monitor to remain silent, and the curve of optimal AN power scheme coincides with the curve of passive eavesdropping scheme. In Fig. 8(b) , we find that the curve of optimal AN power scheme firstly coincides with the curve of constant covert AN power scheme, and then coincides with the curve of passive eavesdropping scheme as ρ a,b is increased, because ρ a,b affects the relationship between E [X] and P J as shown in (24) . When the value of ρ a,b is small, E [X] increases with P J . Hence, the constant covert AN power scheme can achieve better performance than the passive eavesdropping scheme. Nevertheless, when the value of ρ a,b is large, E [X] decreases with P J and the passive eavesdropping scheme outperforms the constant covert AN power scheme. In both Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) , the proposed optimal AN power scheme achieves the best performance in terms of eavesdropping non-outage probability.
Moreover, we see that E [X] increases with ρ a,b . It indicates that the channel uncertainty of the Suspicious link is an effective way to achieve a better eavesdropping performance. However, channel uncertainty of the Jamming link only has effect on eavesdropping performance when the self-interference at Monitor is small just as shown in Fig. 6 . Hence, we conclude that Suspicious Link uncertainty is crucial to improve the surveillance performance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the performance of wireless surveillance systems under a covert constraint. Considering the channel uncertainties of both the Suspicious Link and Jamming Link, In contrast, Jamming Link channel uncertainty can affect the covert surveillance performance only when the interference caused by AN at Bob is greater than the self-interference at the full-duplex Monitor.
We hope that this paper can provide a new paradigm for designing legitimate surveillance schemes when the suspicious users are intelligent and capable of detecting the AN from Monitor.
APPENDIX A
We can rewrite (17) as
where ϕ (x) = 1
x .
Then, since P J has no effect on ϕ (x), the derivative dξ * dP J can be written as
It is evident that the monotonic relationship between ξ * and P J depends on dξ * dP J . First, we introduce auxiliary variables θ = exp −
Following that, dξ * dP J is given by
It is evident that dθ dP J < 0 and β ln β + 1 − β ≥ 0. Thus, dξ * dP J < 0. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX B
A. The monotonicity of ξ * with ρ a,b
Since ρ a,b has no effect on ϕ (x), the derivative dξ * dρ a,b can be written as
By following similar procedures as in Appendix A, ∂ξ * ∂λ 1 is given by
It is obvious that 0 < θ < 1, thus θ ln θ < 0, and β ln β + 1 − β ≥ 0. Hence, we have dξ * dρ a,b > 0. The proof is completed.
B. The monotonicity of ξ * with ρ m,b
Since ρ m,b has no effect on ϕ (x), the derivative dξ * dρ m,b can be written as
Then, dξ * dρ m,b is given by 
where L (x) = exp (x) Ei (−x).
